

# BAHRAIN

*A monthly newsletter issued by the Bahrain Freedom Movement*

## Beyond the Exclusion Zone

The Internal Problems Dictate Foreign Policy in Gulf Capitals

The reaction of some Arab rulers to the latest escalation of hostilities between the Western Allies and Iraq may have caught Western diplomatic circles with surprise. Only last year, the same rulers had sanctioned the use of force to crush the Iraqi forces and liberate Kuwait. More than half a million soldiers were massed in the Eastern part of the Arabian peninsula to launch a massive attack on Iraq un-paralleled in recent history since the second world war. The aim then was clear; the unconditional liberation of Kuwait which had been subjected to a brutal occupation by Iraq's army since 2nd August 1990. Apart from few Arab governments who viewed the efforts of the Allies as yet another form of the "War of the Crusaders" no serious challenge was presented to the Western crusade. It was then known that if the occupied territory was not that of the oil-rich Kuwait no Western leader would have raised his eyebrow in protest against Saddam's venture. The total indifference to the killings of Muslims in Bosnia by the Serbs is nothing but a stark evidence of the lack of any moral motivation in today's world where moral values come second to economical and political interests.

The apparent reluctance of the governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain and other countries to identify with the latest row between the Western Allies and Iraq has a different dimension. The Saudis believe the continuation of the status quo in Iraq is not totally undesirable. In fact it had been reported that Riyadh had lobbied fiercely to stop the military efforts in February 1991 reaching Baghdad and toppling Saddam Hussain's regime. The argument of the Saudis was that the crushing of the regime in Baghdad would play nicely in Iran's hands, an outcome the West could hardly accept. It was Riyadh's efforts which discouraged the Western armies from intervening as the Iraqi army launched its counter attack against the popular uprising in Southern Iraqi cities last year which resulted in crushing the most challenging efforts by the Iraqi opposition to put an end to the Saddam Hussain's regime. The same sensitive political calculations are now behind Riyadh's reluctance to agree to the establishment of a safe Security Zone in Southern Iraq to protect the Shia Muslims from Saddam's aggression. The same is true with the stands of the Bahrain Government which had allowed the country to be used as the main headquarters of the American troops in the Gulf for the last 20 years.

What then is the explanation of this paradox in the policies of the Gulf rulers vis-a-vis Iraq? Since Saddam Hussain's continued pres-

ence is in itself a real challenge to the stability of the region, why do these tribal regimes oppose further actions to undermine his authority? Perhaps they know that the West is not serious in its clamour to threaten the regime in Baghdad. Indeed, many ills that have befallen the region in the last quarter of a century were due to the Ba'th Party's policies in the region and its unsettling attitudes towards the people of the Gulf. But what is also true is the fact that internal policies of these regimes are themselves a major obstacle in formulating foreign policies. They fear the collapse of Baghdad's regime could lead to a series of political changes in the region possibly leading to the erosion of their authority.

The main aim of the Exclusion Zone in Southern Iraq is to provide a safe have to the Arab people of the marshes who are mostly Shia Muslims. The idea is to create a similar environment to what was done in Northern Iraq last year. The earlier effort were not opposed by the Gulf regimes. Is it because of the religious affiliation of the inhabitants of the Arabs of the marshes? Here there are two considerations; firstly any change in the political structure in Iraq will almost certainly have serious repercussions in the Gulf. If some form of a democratic regime is established in Baghdad following the downfall of Saddam Hushing, it will shake the tense situation in the Gulf and lead to a gradual erosion of the authority of the Gulf tires. Secondly; since the Gulf region has a sizeable Shia Muslims community, the Gulf regimes fear the improvement of the situation among the Iraqi Shia Muslims will have unlimited effects on their co-religionists in the Gulf. That is a nightmare for both the Saudi and Bahraini authorities. For decades, the Shia Muslims in that region have been the underdog, and it is difficult for the Al Saud and Al Khalifa to accept an improvement in their status.

This internal situation is reflecting itself directly in the outward looking policies of the regimes in Riyadh and Manama. The two governments will oppose any move that could lead to a situation wherry they feel compelled to initiate a political change in their countries. In fact the Prime Minister of Bahrain has been striving to breach the political isolation of Saddam Hushing. In the last three months Khalifa bin Salman has indicated his willingness to undermine the anti-Saddam sentiments by uttering statements of support and has gone out of his way to call for a rapprochement with the regime in Baghdad. Of course, Khalifa has several grudges with the Al Sabah of Kuwait, but the fact is that....Continued on Page 4

## Imam Khoei Mourned



The passing away of the Grand Ayatullah Abul Qassim Al Khoei in Iraq last month was echoed by grief and sorrow in the streets of Bahrain. A victim of Saddam Hussain's repression, the late Ayatullah who was the highest religious authority of the Shia Muslims died in agony 15 months after he had been put under house arrest by the notorious Iraq's security service. His death on 8th August brought home the message that Iraq's Shias are being targeted by Baghdad's regime in a way which is reminiscent of events in Germany in the thirties.

As soon as the news of the demise of Ayatullah Khoei reached Bahrain, the people rushed to the streets in grief, and declared an unspecified period of mourning. Every corner of the country was the scene of a memorial service, and processions passed through the streets of Manama and other villages for a full week. Speeches were delivered and condolences were exchanged. The event was used by the people to express anger and frustration towards the situation in Iraq and Bahrain. They know the similarities between the regimes in Baghdad and Manama and spared no time in arranging a massive show of force in the streets.

The authorities were unahppy about what was going on, and indeed, attempts were made on several occasions to disrupt the processions which had attracted more than 3000 people over a period of five days. Members of the security forces were present and were following the events with fear and frustration. Riot police in full gear were also present, and at one stage, used force to divert the procession. In the ensuing scuffles, some people were injured and few arrests were made. The authorities were anxious to avoid confrontation in that charged atmosphere while disapproving the idea of people taking to the streets shouting political slogans, even if they were against the Iraqi dictator. After all, the Prime Minister did not want to encourage anti-Saddam sentiments at a time when he was asking for ties to be restored with Baghdad's regime.

Massive processions took place throughout Bahrain immediately after people had learnt of the demise of the Grand Ayatullah Abu Al-Qassim Al Khoi who passed away on 8th August 1992. Riot police intervened several times to try to disrupt the people's march, but the determination of young men thwarted the attempts of the security service.



## Bahrain-Kuwait-Bahrain in Chains

On 24.12.1991, Mr. Abdul Nabi Hasan Marhoon, 26, was travelling from Bahrain to Kuwait through Saudi Arabia by road. As he was trying to cross into Kuwait through the border post of Nuwaisib, he was detained for three hours. The reason was that his name was similar to that of a wanted man. He had been crossing into and from Kuwait several times before and after the Iraqi occupation but had never been suspected. After intense interrogation, Mr. Marhoon was released.

A similar incident happened to him as he tried to enter Kuwait on 15.7.1992. Mr. Marhoon was detained at the border post and after another course of interrogation, he was released on the condition that he reported to the Security Service. Four days later, he was arrested for four days, during which he had to endure horrible treatment including torture. He was deported to Bahrain and told not to come back to Kuwait until he is cleared by the Kuwaiti Embassy in Bahrain.

Being a young businessman, Mr. Marhoon contacted the Embassy on 26.7.1992 and was told to wait for few days for clearance of his visa. Two days later, the Bahraini Security Service, on the order of Mr. Ian Henderson, paid him a "surprise visit" at 5.30 in the morning. After searching the house intensively, he was taken to Al Qal'a interrogation centre. He was accused of establishing relations with the Bahraini opposition in Kuwait, and having contacts with Saddam Hussain's opponents. He was also accused of having relations with Bahrainis inside the country whose conduct is not acceptable to the government. The charges were so absurd that they were refuted as soon as they were uttered.

Mr. Marhoon had to endure a lot of physical and psychological abuse in Bahraini prisons throughout his four-day ordeal. He was released on 2.8.1992 without charge. He is still banned from entering Kuwait.

Mr. Marhoon is yet another victim of the dispute between the two governments of Bahrain and Kuwait. Since the relations between the tribal regimes erupted into the open in June, many Bahrainis in Kuwait were detained, tortured and some of them deported. Those who

were sent back to Bahrain were badly treated by the Al Khalifa government. Instead of treating them with honour and respect, being the victims who had been caught in the crossfire between the two governments, they were treated with utter disrespect, and even abused. This is how Bahrainis live under the rule of the Al Khalifa.

## Bahrain : Closed Trial

In its issue. No. 15 (July 1992), Article 19 reported on the deficiencies of the political trials in Bahrain. The following is an excerpt of the report:

Eleven Bahraini citizens were tried on February 26 1992 under the 1974 State Security Law charged with membership of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, an illegal organisation. ARTICLE 19 understands that the eleven, all young workers or students, have denied being members of the organisation and have pleaded not guilty, maintaining they were detained as a result of peaceful political activities. Lawyers acting for them have insisted that the charges were based on confessions obtained as a result of torture.

ARTICLE 19 fears that in the past the State Security Court has convicted defendants solely on the basis of confessions obtained through torture. Such confessions were judged admissible as evidence even when unsupported by corroborating evidence, including that of witnesses.

These particular defendants were given an unfair, closed trial which did not comply with international norms for fair trial. Since State Security Courts in Bahrain permit neither jury nor appeal, ARTICLE 19 has called on the Prime Minister to ensure that the defendants are given a fair and impartial retrial in accordance with international standards; that representatives of international and regional human rights organisations be allowed to observe the trial, and that public and media access to the court is granted.

Write to: His Excellency Al Sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, Prime Minister, PO Box 1000, Manama, Bahrain

## Pilgrimage to Saudi Cells

As Sheikh Mohammed Jawad Mahdi, 27, was trying to cross into Saudi Arabia via the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia causeway, he was arrested and taken by the Saudi police to Riyadh. Mr. Mahdi was on his way to visit Mecca last month, having returned to Bahrain from six-year exile.

Inside the Saudi jail in Riyadh, the young religious preacher was treated for a course of torture, including various forms of abuse. He was asked about his faith, his friends, the place of his studies, i.e. the Hol City of Qom. He was not charged with any offence apart from being a Shia Muslim. He was released after seven days of intense questioning and returned home immediately. Nothing is known about this young man, and whether further questioning by the Bahraini authorities as is usual in such cases in a country in which citizens are repressed.

## Water Charges to Be Raised

The water problem continues to grow. Poor planning and spending patterns by the authorities have brought about an acute water shortage. Currently, Bahrain's peak water consumption reaches some 70 million gallons per day. Of these, some 25 million gallons per day are extracted from underground aquifers. For years, specialists from the United Nations and other organisations have been warning of the dangers associated with the extraordinary state of date palms and other agricultural programmes.

The desalination plants are extremely expensive. The Al Khalifa members own mansions and resorts whose consumption of water is peculiar but pay no charges.

In order to check consumption, the authorities have issued a warning this summer to the public that in the event water useage continues its rise, new charges will be levied. Already, the government has been making money from water tax. In the fiscal year ending 31st December 1992, the state is expected to earn some BD 4,657,500 (\$12.3 million) from water sales. The average Bahraini is burdened with lots of expenses and service charges for the state, most of which are not considered value for money.

## Wrong Policy on Foreign Workers

Bahrain's expatriates are too many and too costly and the country is highly populated. Foreign workers make more than 55 per cent of the labour force at a time when the national unemployment has reached intolerable rates. The expatriate spend very little in Bahrain and instead remit their funds back home.

Too small a country

To begin with, Bahrain's geographic area is 258 sq. miles, with a population of 518,243. Bahrain ranks among the first ten countries in the world in terms of the highest population density per square mile. Of the population figures in 1991, only 322,347 or 62.2 per cent of the population are nationals and the balance (37.8 per cent) are expatriates from different parts of the world, especially India and Pakistan.

In 1990, the Bahrainis numbered 336,200 and the expatriates some 168,800. In the same year, the labour force stood at 201,800. Only 90,100 of these were Bahrainis. Thus, only 26.8 per cent of the nationals were in the labour forces. All world statistics consider Bahrain as having the one of the lowest percentages of native people in the labour force. The expatriate community represents 55.3 per cent of the labour force. The ruthless rulers of Bahrain are setting adverse records in various fields. Given the insufficient domestic labour, Bahrain had to entice expatriates both professionals and otherwise to assist in running the economy. This is well understood but what is not understood is the huge number of foreign workers.

Unemployment is a serious problem. A report published by the Central Intelligence Agency of the US put Bahrain's unemployment in 1990 at around 10 percent. Sources close to the Ministry of Labour assert that unemployment rate among Bahrainis ranges from 25-30 per cent. The regime has been indifferent to the plight of the unemployed for years except for some hollow propaganda in the media. With so many Bahrainis jobless, one wonders of the logic of having so many expatriates.

For the Al Khalifa it is a matter of making business. Tens of offices in the capital, Manama, devote their services to bringing labours, housemaids and the like. Another business is called the "free visa", which enables individuals with influence to bring some 200 or 500 expatriates from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Philippines to Bahrain for no specific jobs. Rather, these poor workers are told to find jobs for themselves in the market place, and more importantly are required to pay the sponsor around \$1000 every three months. The living conditions for the semi-skilled foreign workers are miserable to say the least. The biggest beneficiaries of bringing foreign workers into Bahrain are members of the greedy Al Khalifa. Laws and all sorts of taxes do not apply on any member of the "royal family". Accordingly, they have been exploiting the nations's resources.

Workers remittances hurt the economy. Earnings of the foreign labour force are sent back home. The majority of expatriates spend very little in Bahrain save the Filipinos and members of the US armed forces. Thus, most expatriates bring little benefits to the economy.

Funds leaving Bahrain through the developed banking industry have been hurting the nations's balance of payment. Governments of countries such as India are enticing their citizens to remit maximum funds to accounts back in India by offering them various facilities and allowances. Since these foreign workers do not have permanent residence permits in the country, they see no reason to keep money in Bahrain. These non-resident expatriates have very little loyalty for the country as evidenced by the Gulf crisis of 1990 caused by the reckless

### Home Thought

## Birds of Feather; Do They Always Stick Together?

The three Western powers; US, Britain and France have finally agreed to impose a ban on Iraqi warplanes and helicopter gunships to prevent them from bombing the people of the marshes of southern Iraq. The US has some 200 aircraft in and around the Gulf region; the French will probably send a squadron of Dassault Mirage-2000. Meanwhile, the British have announced their contribution to the "no-fly" zone will be six RAF Tornados GR1 and GR1A reconnaissance aircraft. They are regarded as the best in the world for tactical reconnaissance missions. (GR1 can also be employed for ground attacks). It is most likely these Tornados will be stationed at Muharrag airbase in Bahrain, despite the apparent reluctance of the Al Khalifa of Bahrain to grant such facilities.

Muharrag is an old RAF base with an excellent ground support facilities and sophisticated communication back-up. It was used as a headquarter for the British contingent during the Gulf War of 1991. It is located in the northeast of Bahrain, and thus is ideal for monitoring the southeast of Iraq.

There is one problem. This time round, the Bahraini government is not keen on what it calls "Iraq bashing" by the West. Indeed, if Saddam Hussain has any friend left amongst the Gulf Cooperation Council states (or anywhere else for that matter) they will be the Al Khalifa of Bahrain. Amongst this rare breed of Saddam's friends, the Prime Minister, Khalifa bin Salman, is the most enthusiastic of all. To him, Saddam is a hero, an idol he tries to imitate. He mimics the Iraqi dictator in almost everything; internal repression of political opponents; violation of basic human rights; political miscalculations, and economic mismanagement. To be fair, they both face similar problems; an educated and a politicised population, the majority of whom are Shia Muslims, that harbour neither love nor respect for their rulers. Yes, one is tempted to construe Khalifa as a miniature of Saddam, a very small but detailed portrait of his idol. The same analogy applies to the country's political life. That is why after the Gulf war the Bahraini government has been quick to call for reconciliation with Iraq, through Western and Arab media. Also, Khalifa spared no occasion to send messages to the Iraqi dictator, something which Baghdad exploited to the full.

One might say this is a show of anger at Kuwait's reluctance to bail out the ailing

Saddam Hussain's occupation of Kuwait. Then, the vast majority of them rushed to pack their luggage and went home.

Certainly, Bahrain needs expatriate community but within a set of parameters. The serious challenge facing the regime is that of finding jobs for Bahrainis. Nothing but talks and broken promises have been offered to the locals. The concept of free visa should be abolished by all means because it is hurting Bahrain's reputation aside from causing further unemployment. Governmental statistics point out that the expatriates will remain significant with no end in sight.

economy of Bahrain. Or that Manama is trying to counter-balance the Qataris growing relations with Iran, by tilting towards Iraq. But, all else apart, there is undoubtedly a strong chemistry between Saddam and Khalifa. Close friends speak of mutual admiration that exists between the two men.

Accordingly, perhaps, the Bahraini media which is as free of governmental control as its Iraqi counterpart is - has been showing a vehement opposition against the aerial exclusion zone announced by the Allies. It condemns it as an attempt to fragment Iraq and harm Iraq's sovereignty. Now then, while this mirrors the theme of the Iraqi media in a very sincere manner, it is in a stark contrast with those presented by others.

There are serious questions. Can Khalifa offend the Saudis and oppose the new Western campaign if Riyadh approves it? Can he get out of his way to show solidarity with an international pariah like Saddam Hussain? Is Khalifa so hopeless and desperate to render the destiny of his ruling family hostage to the Ba' th Party? Above all how far can Khalifa adopt a stand which is not in line with that of Britain and the US?

We can't readily support the idea of foreign intervention (even through international mandate) in Arab and Muslim land. We have always wished the time would not come when foreign powers take charge of our region.

However, Khalifa's underlying concern is different from this. For just like Saddam, Khalifa has a hollow language for public consumption, but is too short when it comes to a real confrontation. That is, of course, with outsiders. Internally, Khalifa is very combative, and always delivers the crack-downs on opponents. When it comes to external powers, even Qatar prevails.

Therefore, it is widely expected that British aircraft as well as American and French (or anybody else) will use Muharrag airbase and the island's docking facilities to tighten the noose on Saddam. Only operational considerations will be taken into account. Meanwhile Khalifa will instruct the media to lower the tone of criticism of Allied forces. Transforming friends into enemies is often an easy task, and His Excellency, our Premier, is very good at it. So, while from the same feather, dictators do not always stick together.

## Demise of the Gulf University

# American Cultural Invasion Makes New Grounds in Bahrain

The Gulf University (AGU) has been experiencing problems ever since its inception. Member states failed to meet their financial obligations. Rivalry and jealousy among members are to blame for the collapse of the institution. Still, others say the US embassy in Bahrain played a behind the scene role to dismantle the University.

The Gulf University was born with fractures. Ever since its inception in the late seventies/early eighties, the University had very little chance of success at best. The plan called for the establishment of the University as a higher education entity. Many intellectuals charged then that the Gulf region was lacking the most scientific back-up prospective students to pursue their careers.

The new university sent around a hundred postgraduates (mostly Iraqis) to study abroad with full salary at home plus a substantial allowance to enable them to take charge later on. Naturally, the Iraqis were the true followers of Saddam and his gangsters (in Iraq higher education was prohibited to individuals not belonging to the "ruling" Ba'th party).

Now who would pay for all of these carnivals and expositions? They happened to be the GCC plus Iraq. Both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait agreed to pay each 25% of the total budget; Bahrain, the host country, was to pay the lowest of all: only 2.5%; the balance was divided among the other member states. The financial miss was the primary reason behind the University's trouble in the first two years of its commencement due to declining revenues. It is worth mentioning the positions of the members as far as financing is concerned. For one, Qatar was never happy with the idea of allowing its arch enemy in the Gulf, the al Khalifa rulers of Bahrain, to be the host of the institution. For another, Oman was in the last stage of completion of Sultan Qabos University. They saw no reason for the Gulf University. In fact, Oman had no desire of sending its students to Bahrain

for fear that the Omanis will learn something about politics from the Gulf's most "politicised" population. The Omani authorities have been reluctant to let citizens of other countries of the Gulf visit Muscat. Only in the late 1980s, did Oman remove the visa requirement from the subjects of its GCC partners. The UAE was possibly the last hope for salvage of the educational entity. But Sheikh Zayed made up his mind of not paying his country's financial share for no clear reasons. Many dignitaries paid fruitless visits to Zayed in the last months prior to the decision of transferring the AGU campus to the University of Bahrain. Kuwait's stance was no better than of Saudi Arabia. To a good extent, the issue was jealousy to see Bahrain being the host and taking credit for the institution. Iraq paid nothing, first claiming that after the 1988 ceasefire with Iran, the needs of the war with its neighbour could barely spare the country extra money to pay more important creditors let alone the Gulf University after the 1988 cease fire with Iran. Iraq said that construction was more important than anything else. Who could oppose Saddam then!

Bahrain remained happy despite all this. The Bahraini authorities were taking pride for being a good member by paying their dues on time. Well, it was only 2.5% of the total expenses. More importantly, Bahrain managed to have the campus with all its extraordinary buildings on its soil. Bahrain stood to lose nothing (the same was true of Iraq too).

Some think the US had a role in the acceleration of the demise of AGU. According to certain sources with inside knowledge, former US ambassador to Bahrain, Sam Zakhum (a graduate of the American University of Beirut) was very active. The story goes that the US and through its special ties with al Khalifa of Bahrain found the University an annoying institution.

The Americans are determined that the British were to keep the security of the country

given Britain's knowledge about the region and more or less efficient management of the intelligence community. The US embassy was assigned three areas: 1) education 2) sports and 3) media. Residents and visitors could easily see the US influence in the media. Ever since Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, the CNN was screened for free. Only in the second half of this year, charges will be introduced. TV viewers of the English channel 55 are used to Dallas, America's Funniest Videos and many other entertainment programmes and movies. News broadcasts offer extensive coverage of events in Washington and Los Angeles. Information Minister Tariq Al Moayyed of Bahrain, who is the longest serving such minister in the Gulf is a regular visitor to the US. Many members of al Khalifa hate al Moayyed but they can't remove him given his strong US backing.

As to the sports, American academicians are regular visitors to the country, and American NBA or basketball is as famous in Manama as it is in Los Angeles or Chicago.

Education is critical. American agents or alumni of the famous American University of Beirut (AUB) are virtually running the University of Bahrain. Despite the fact that Bahrain's education was planned on the British system, the US agents managed to exert enough influence and turn the University of Bahrain into a totally American-oriented institution, to the dismay of Britain. The Gulf University was not under the full influence of the US embassy in Manama and that has been bothering them. Both Saudi Arabia and Iraq were working to make the ill-fated educational establishment within their domain of influence. The financial difficulties facing AGU was good news for US agents in the Gulf. Through their direct and indirect influence, the Americans managed to convince people with significant power to accelerate the closure of AGU at least temporarily. There were even futile plans to have the American University of Beirut taking over the former campus of AGU.

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the Bahraini Premier is the Saddam Hussain of Bahrain, and would like the world to know him as such. He is against any form of democracy or freedom of expression. He is adopting, through his British-managed security apparatus, styles of torture and repression similar to those adopted by Saddam's brutal regime. He is deeply anti-Shia, and indeed, anti any moral or human value. It is only because Bahrain is tiny and uninfluenced that Khalifa bin Salman is not widely known for his Hitler-style policies.

The following weeks will decide the seriousness of the situation in Iraq. One of the problems associated with the idea of the Exclusion Zone is the fear of partitioning Iraq. This is a nightmare to both the Iraqis and the other governments of the region. Although the Western Allies have maintained their opposition to the partitioning of Iraq, they have not ruled out

the possibility of such an outcome. The worry is that the fragmentation of Iraq may put the whole region in a state of anarchy not too dissimilar to that engulfing what was Yugoslavia. Furthermore, a more sustained Western presence in the region is in itself an undesirable outcome. It is not going to solve the problems of the region, and is unlikely to lead to a more prosperous and developed situation. This is true especially in light of the fact that encouraging democracy is not a priority in their agenda. People believe the main aim of the Western thrust is to defend the status quo in which the tribal regimes remain the absolute rulers and the people remain subordinate to backward-looking tribes. In fact if Iraq had been governed in a more civilised way its people would not have been subjected to the misery and terror of the last twenty five years.

The planners of actions in Washington,

London and Paris ought to have a different approach to the problems of the Gulf region. Indeed, oil is a vital commodity to the whole world and should be protected, but this is not synonymous to the idea of maintaining the present form of government in the region. Saddam Hussain's style of leadership is a prototype that is being imitated in the capitals of the Gulf countries. The failure of these regimes to understand the fact that their own people are the sources of power and strength, and their potentials may only be utilised if they are respected and their rights are protected.

The double standards manifested by the latest political stands of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are more serious than their apparent significance vis-a-vis the efforts to unsettle Saddam Hussain's regime. They are of a long-term nature and are directly related to the form of the political regimes they are ready to entertain in Riyadh and Manama.